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We investigate critical properties of a spatial evolutionary game based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Simulations demonstrate a jump in the component densities accompanied by drastic changes in
average sizes of the component clusters. We argue that the cluster boundary is a random fractal.
Our simulations are consistent with the fractal dimension of the boundary being equal to 2, and the
cluster boundaries are hence asymptotically space filling as the system size increases.
The surge of interest in game theory can be traced
to the seminal works of John Nash in the middle of the
20th century. The main subject of classical game theory
is finding the optimal strategy in games between two or
more individuals (players or agents), where each individ-
ual has several possible behaviors. A repeated game is a
situation where the same agents play the game with the
same rules multiple times. Rational behavior of an agent
then evolves with time based on the memory of past en-
counters. An agent’s strategy thus evolves, the so-called
evolution of cooperation [1, 2].
A prototypical model in game theory is the so-called
Prisoner’s Dilemma, played by two agents in discrete
time steps. In each round of the game, each agent uses
one of two possible strategies, cooperate C or defect D,
and receives a payoff that depends on the strategies of
the agent and its opponent [3].
Evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., [4–7] and the ref-
erences therein) investigates the behavior of large pop-
ulations, where a macroscopic number of agents use a
finite number of strategies. While classical game theory
deals with individual agents, evolutionary game theory
focuses on the winning strategies themselves rather than
individuals. Spatial evolutionary games are played with
agents arranged in some spatial structures and interact-
ing with other agents in their immediate neighborhoods.
Various geometries have been explored, including regu-
lar grids [8, 9], random graphs and small world networks
[10], and evolving random graphs [11, 12].
The spatial arrangement of agents yields emergent ge-
ometric structures—groups of agents who synchronize
their behaviors with their neighbors and compete with
other groups. The temporal evolution of these geometric
structures can be highly nontrivial.
In this letter, we study a simple version of an evo-
lutionary game based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma [8, 9].
The game is deterministic, and the time evolution is gov-
erned by a single parameter, the payoff ratio. Although
the local rules are apparently simple, the steady state
of the game features a series of very different dynamic
regimes separated by sharp transitions. We character-
ize the geometric properties of the emergent structures
across transitions.
We obtained several results that might be surprising
for the statistical physics community. We found that
transitions between steady states of the structures are
not related to any kind of transitions known in statistical
mechanics. The transitions are sharp but are not similar
to first-order thermodynamic transitions [13]. Clusters of
agents with similar strategies do percolate from boundary
to boundary of the finite systems investigated. And in
contrast to the percolation clusters in thermodynamic
equilibrium [14, 15], the dimension of the fractals is 2
in the plane. A cluster boundary looks very irregular,
and the dimension of the boundary is again equal to the
dimension of the space.
Following Refs. [8, 9], we define the game rules as fol-
lows: L2 agents are arranged on an L×L rectangular grid
in two dimensions. The game is globally synchronous and
is played in discrete time steps. At each time step, an
agent interacts with its eight neighbors (the chess king’s
moves) and itself [22]. The total score of an agent in a
round is the sum of the payoffs of all nine games played in
the current round. When all pairwise games are played
and all payoffs are known, agents change their strategies
for the next round. Various adaptation behaviors are
possible. We use the simplest case of maximally oppor-
tunistic agents with a short memory: at each time step,
an agent adopts the strategy with the maximum payoff
among itself and its opponents in the preceding round.
For two agents, this strategy is trivial. It becomes more
interesting when the maximally opportunistic adaptation
is used in a spatial evolutionary context.
The payoff an agent receives in an elementary game
depends on the strategies of the agent and its opponent.
We use the following payoff structure [8, 9]: (i) If both
agents defect, they receive nothing. (ii) If both agents
cooperate, each of them receives a payoff of S, which
we set to S = 1 without loss of generality. (iii) In the
interaction of C and D, the defector receives a payoff T >
S and the cooperator receives zero. The payoff structure
hence depends on only one parameter, the payoff ratio
b = T/S.
The spatial game can obviously be described as a cel-
lular automaton with a particular set of transition rules,
but the description in terms of cellular automata turns
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
03
92
2v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  1
0 N
ov
 20
17
2out to be very complex: the state of an agent in the next
round depends on the payoffs of its neighbors, which in
turn depend on their neighbors. Because 25 agents are
relevant, the transition table size is 225, in contrast to
the transition matrix for Conway’s Game of Life, which
has 29 = 512 rules.
Qualitative analysis.— The game is deterministic, and
the full time evolution is completely defined by the initial
conditions (the spatial distribution of strategies C and D
at t = 0) and the value of the payoff parameter b. The
discrete structure of the payoffs leads to a series of very
different dynamic regimes separated by sharp transitions
at special values of b. Moreover, for fixed initial con-
ditions, the dynamics is exactly identical for all values
of b between these transition points. Statistical fluctu-
ations enter via our use of random, unstructured initial
conditions: physical observables are calculated as aver-
ages over both time evolution in the steady state (which
is deterministic given initial conditions) and the ensem-
ble average over a set of realizations of initial conditions
(where the steady states are equivalent in the statistical
sense).
It is instructive to consider the time evolution of small
local objects, i.e., clusters of one strategy embedded into
a sea of the other strategy. For b < 1, defectors always
lose. For b > 3, cooperators unconditionally win. For 1 <
b < 9/5, a zoo of various small objects (gliders, rotators,
etc.) are possible. Small clusters of D remain small and
large clusters of D shrink. Conversely, for b > 9/5, a 2×2
or larger cluster of D grows. The situation is reversed for
defectors: a 2×2 cluster of C grows for b < 2, while a
large cluster of C shrinks for b > 2.
Therefore, 9/5 < b < 2 is the fierce competition regime
where clusters of C can grow in regions of D and vice
versa. Starting from a single defector in a center of a large
game field, the steady state is a dynamic fractal with
a well-defined average density of D, the “evolutionary
kaleidoscope” in Ref. [9].
Numerical simulations.— To study the time evolution
of the game with random, unstructured initial conditions,
we use a direct numerical simulation. We arrange L2
agents on an L×L square grid with L up to 1000. We use
periodic boundary conditions to minimize edge effects.
We use up to 2×105 time steps for small lattices and up
to 2×103 time steps for larger lattices. For the initial
state of the game field at t = 0, we assign the strategy C
to an agent with a fixed probability pi. We consider up
to 100 realizations of the initial conditions (replicas). To
compute steady-state averages, we discard the first 103
iterations for equilibration.
In agreement with Refs. [8, 9], we find that typical con-
figurations of the game field change drastically across the
critical value of bc = 9/5. For b < bc, cooperators form
relatively static web-like structures spanning the entire
game field; for b > bc, the game field features “blobs”
of various sizes (see Fig. 1). Clusters of both C and D
move, grow, and collide chaotically, leading to the game
field changing at time scales of the order of several time
steps.
To quantify the apparent changes of the game dynam-
ics as b varies, we compute the average density of coop-
erators in the steady state for a range of payoffs b > 1.
For each value of b, we take 25 independent realizations
of the initial conditions and compute time averages of
the density of cooperators discarding the first 103 time
steps for equilibration and averaging over up to 2 × 104
steps. Figure 2 shows the results of these simulations.
We clearly see a sharp transition around the predicted
value bc = 9/5, where the average steady state density of
C drops from ∼ 0.7–0.9 to ∼ 0.3.
Several features stand out in Fig. 2. First, not only
the average value changes at b = bc, but also the spread
of individual measurements increases dramatically. The
spread itself is clearly a finite-size effect, which pro-
gressively decreases as L increases. Second, the aver-
age density fC for b > bc agrees well with the value
fC = 12 log 2 − 8 ≈ 0.32, found in [9] for regular “evo-
lutionary kaleidoscopes,” which develop from an initial
state with a single cooperator and L2 − 1 defectors.
Cluster size distribution.— To characterize the transi-
tion at b = bc, we perform the following simulation. At
each time step, we decompose the game field into con-
nected clusters of C and D, and record the “mass” (i.e.,
the number of sites) of each cluster. Figure 3 shows the
distribution w(m) of masses of clusters of D for b < bc
and b > bc, collected over 1000 time steps of 100 indepen-
dent realizations of initial conditions for L = 100. For
b < bc, clusters larger than the system size are virtually
nonexistent, and the distribution has a maximum at the
size of around 10 sites. The middle part of the distri-
bution, for 20 < m < 80, is well fit by an exponential
function w(m) ∼ B exp(−λm) with the best-fit values
B = 0.16(2) and λ = 0.12(1) (numbers in parentheses
represent the fit error bars in units of the last digit). We
now stress that the smoothness of the distribution is a
result of averaging over the initial conditions: the cluster
size distribution for each particular replica is noisy and
does not display any discernible structure.
For b > bc, the situation is markedly different: the
distribution is monotonic, where the initial faster-than-
exponential drop for m . L is followed by a long tail
that is well fit by an exponential decay w(m > 100) ∼
B exp(−λm) with B = 3.7(2) × 10−3 and λ = 0.018(2).
Here, the time averaging is much more effective than for
b < bc because the game field changes substantially at
the time scale of several time steps.
Cluster boundaries.— We again decompose the game
field into connected clusters at each time step. We then
record the total length of the interface between the areas
occupied by C and D. We define the interface length p as
the number of bonds connecting agents of different kinds
(the total number of bonds is 2L2 on an L×L game field
3FIG. 1: (Color online.) Representative snapshots of the game field for b = 1.74 (left), b = 1.79 (center) and b = 1.81 (right).
The color coding is consistent with Ref. [8, 9]: blue is C, red is D, yellow is a D that was a C in the preceding round, and green
is a C that was a D in the preceding round. See text for discussion.
FIG. 2: Density of cooperators fC as function of the pay-
off b with lattice sizes 20×20 (circles), 50×50 (triangles),
and 100×100 (squares). All simulations are performed at
b = 1.651, 1.675, 1.701, 1.725, 1.751, 1.775, 1.801, 1.825, 1.851
(for clarity, triangles are shifted horizontally slightly to the
right and squares, to the left). Error bars are shown for all
points and reflect averaging over 25 independent realizations
of the initial conditions, each simulated for 2×104 genera-
tions. Dashed lines are to guide the eye. We note that for
b > 9/5, the average density agrees with the magic value
fC = 12 log 2− 8 ≈ 0.318 [9]. See the text for discussion.
with periodic boundary conditions). This definition of
the interface length clearly depends on the system size.
A natural expectation is that p scales as some power θ
of the system size L. Several scenarios are possible. If
we naively regard clusters of strategies as droplets of im-
miscible liquids, then we expect p ∝ L. A space-filling
curve would have p ∝ L2. A power-law scaling with a
noninteger exponent would indicate that the interface is
b θ A c
1.81 1.99(1) 0.35(1) -20(05)
1.79 1.99(1) 0.34(1) -13(11)
1.74 2.07(5) 0.22(4) 5(9)
1.64 2.03(2) 0.29(2) -5(6)
1.49 2.00(3) 0.30(3) -2(8)
1.39 2.02(3) 0.24(3) 2(6)
1.32 2.03(2) 0.18(2) 5(4)
1.28 1.96(5) 0.26(5) -4(9)
1.19 1.98(4) 0.24(4) -1(7)
TABLE I: Interface length as a function of L. Fit errors
are shown in units of the last digit. For each value of b,
we simulate with L from 10 to 200 and fit the results with
p(L) ∼ A× Lθ + c. See the text for discussion.
fractal [16].
For each value of b, we simulate for a range of L and
measure the steady-state average value of p. We then fit
the results with a power law p(L) ∼ A× Lθ + c with A,
c, and θ as fitting parameters. Here, A is the amplitude,
and we also include the free term c. We expect the scaling
exponent θ to differentiate between the regimes b < bc
and b > bc. The results are summarized in Table I. We
find that the amplitude A depends on b only weakly. The
value of the parameter c somehow reflects what can be
seen in Fig. 1, i.e., that the effective correlations are of
the order of the lattice spacing in the left figures and
larger in the right figure. Most surprisingly, the scaling
exponent θ is consistent with θ = 2 for all values of b.
To double-check this result, we further calculate using
a more traditional definition of the fractal dimension of
the interface. Namely, we use the standard definition of
the fractal dimension of a closed set in two dimensions,
the so-called Minkowski dimension [17, 18]. Let N(`) be
the minimum number of boxes necessary to completely
4FIG. 3: Cluster mass distributions w(m) normalized such that∑
m w(m) = 1, for b = 1.79 (top) and b = 1.81 (bottom).
Here, L = 100, and the initial condition is that an agent is
a defector with probability pi = 0.21. The simulations are
done for 100 independent realizations of initial conditions.
Each realization is simulated for 100 (1000) steps for b =
1.79 (b = 1.81) after a 1000 steps for equilibration. Longer
simulation times do not change the picture, and the results are
independent of the system size. See the text for discussion.
cover the cluster interface with boxes of linear extent `.
Then the Minkowski dimension is defined as
ds = lim
`→0
logN(`)
− log ` . (1)
Because the game field is inherently discrete, we use
the following procedure. We cover the interface with
boxes of increasing linear size ` and linearly fit the log-
arithm of the number of covering boxes as a function of
logarithm of `. In our fitting procedure, we discard both
the smallest box sizes of the order of several lattice spac-
ings (because the discreteness of the lattice is essential at
these scales) and the largest box sizes of the order of L
(because any curve is space filling at these length scales).
L ds(b = 1.79) ds(b = 1.81)
100 1.776(1) 1.380(1)
200 1.762(1) 1.762(1)
500 1.936(1) 1.936(1)
1000 1.957(1) 1.957(1)
TABLE II: Minkowski dimension of the interface. The num-
bers in parentheses show the errors in units of the last digit
and include both fitting errors and statistical variations be-
tween measurements.
We simulate 10 independent realizations of the initial
configuration with the probability pi = 0.21 of an agent
being a defector. For each run, we take 20 snapshots, sep-
arated by 10 time steps. For each snapshot, we use (1) to
extract the Minkowski dimension. The fitting procedure
is illustrated in Fig. 4 for the system size L = 200 and
the parameter value b = 1.81. The results averaged over
both time and initial conditions are reported in Table II.
FIG. 4: Box counting for an interface with b = 1.81 and L =
200. Other system sizes and payoff parameters are similar.
Points are the number of square boxes of a given linear extent
needed to completely cover the interface. The straight line is
a linear fit logN(`) ∝ 1.95 log (1/`) in the window −4.2 <
log(1/`) < −2.6. See the text for discussion.
We find that the values of both the scaling exponent
of the cluster interface θ (see Table I) and the Minkowski
dimension of the cluster interface ds tend to the limit
value of 2 as L→∞. In other words, the cluster bound-
ary (and the cluster interface) are not lines but rather
scale as the surface area. In the pictures at the cen-
ter and the right in Fig. 1, it is not easy to see that all
three different objects (blue regions, red regions, and the
boundary between them) have the properties of surfaces.
Nevertheless, the analysis presented here supports this
nonobvious fact.
The simulated system in the range of parameters in-
vestigated always reaches some state (after a sufficient
relaxation from the initial state), which is either steady-
state or almost steady-state with the small local details
at the boundaries being cyclic with a few time steps and
5not influencing the discussed global geometry. The result
of the analysis is that the geometric structures emerge as
the steady (or almost steady) state of the complex dy-
namic process. The rules are local, but the steady-state
structures demonstrate some global behavior.
There are examples of regular fractals with boundaries
described by the fractal dimension 2: Julia sets and the
boundary of the Mandelbrot set [19]. In our case, the
steady-state structures are quite random self-organized
structures, not regular fractals. At the same time, to
the best of our knowledge, there have been no previous
examples of random self-organized structures with the
cluster interface filling the space as we have shown here.
We stress that our structures shown in Fig. 1 look sim-
ilar to those emerging in various examples of percolation,
including discontinuous percolation (see, e.g., the short
review [20]) and the mixing-phase transition [21], but the
interfaces in those examples never scale with the expo-
nent 2. Another difference is that the behavior changes
only for a discrete set of the control parameter value b
and we do not have a distance to these critical values, as
with usual critical phenomena [14].
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